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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j)(1990). Plaintiff-
Appellant, Covecrest Properties ("Covecrest") appeals a final 
Order. Ruling and Judgment, issued by the Third Judicial 
District Court in favor of Defendant, City of West Jordan. 
Judgment was entered on March 8, 1990, and 
Plaintiffs-Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal on April 
3, 1990. 
INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE 
Pursuant to Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Covecrest hereby adopts and incorporates by this 
reference, the Brief filed by the other Appellants, in 
support of this appeal. In addition, Covecrest respectfully 
files this separate brief to more fully develop the following 
determinative issues. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The determinative issues for this Court's review are 
as follows: 
I 
WERE SUBDIVIDERS REQUIRED TO FILE A NOTICE OF 
CLAIM UNDER UTAH'S GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT, 
BEFORE THEY FILED A LAWSUIT AGAINST THE CITY 
TO RECOVER IMPACT FEES COLLECTED UNDER AN 
ORDINANCE DETERMINED TO BE VOID AB INITIO? 
IF NOTICE WAS REQUIRED, WAS IT SATISFIED BY 
NOTICE SENT ON BEHALF OF ALL SUBDIVIDERS 
SIMILARLY SITUATED, AND/OR BY THE 
COMMENCEMENT OF A LAWSUIT CHALLENGING THE 
VALIDITY OF THE ORDINANCE? 
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II 
WHAT IS THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
FOR COMMENCING AN ACTION TO RECOVER IMPACT 
FEES COLLECTED AND RETAINED BY THE CITY 
THROUGH MISTAKE OR WITHOUT AUTHORITY? 
Ill 
WHEN DID THE SUBDIVIDERS• CAUSES OF ACTION 
ACCRUE AND DID THEY FILE TIMELY? IF NOT, WAS 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS TOLLED? 
IV 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING THE 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE THE CITY'S 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES OF MISTAKE, ESTOPPEL, 
WAIVER, LACHES, AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT, WHICH, 
ARE NOT AVAILABLE TO A MUNICIPALITY THAT 
COLLECTS AND RETAINS MONEY WITHOUT AUTHORITY, 
AND/OR BECAUSE THE CLAIMED DEFENSES WERE 
WITHOUT FACTUAL BASIS? 
Standard of Review: The Court should review the 
facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the 
subdividers, and may freely reappraise the trial court's 
legal conclusions. Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat. Bank. 737 P.2d 
225, 229 (Utah 1987). 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF UTAH CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES 
Reproduced in Addendum: 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-11 (1990). 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25 (1989). 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-36 (1990). 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This lawsuit involves consolidated actions to recover 
impact fees paid to the City of West Jordan pursuant to an 
2 
ordinance determined by the Utah Supreme Court to be void ab 
initio in 1986. 
Covecrest Properties, a Utah limited partnership, was 
a subdivider. In January and June 1978, the City of West 
Jordan required Covecrest to pay impact fees under Ordinance 
No. 33, Section 9-C-8(a). The Ordinance was being challenged 
by other subdividers in the Third Judicial District Court for 
the State of Utah, and had been commenced in 1979 as a class 
action complaint against the City of West Jordan. 
Prior to initiating the suit, written demand on 
behalf of named subdividers, and all other subdividers who 
were required to pay impact fees under the ordinance, was 
made to the City of West Jordan. 
While the lawsuit was pending, Covecrest filed for 
approval of planned subdivisions, but was required to pay the 
impact fee, before the City would approve the subdivision 
applications. 
In 1986, the Utah Supreme Court determined the impact 
fee ordinance to be void ab initio. Call v. West Jordan. 727 
P.2d 180 (Utah 1986). On November 24, 1987, Covecrest 
initiated suit against the City of West Jordan in the Third 
Judicial District Court, Case No. C87-7680. It was 
consolidated into this action by order of Judge Brian on 
August 26, 1988. 
The City moved for partial summary judgment, claiming 
that the subdividers1 actions were barred by the applicable 
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statute of limitations. The subdividers filed a cross-motion 
for summary judgment on the statute of limitation issue, and 
a separate motion for summary judgment to strike the 
affirmative defenses raised by the City. 
The trial court granted the Cityfs motion for partial 
summary judgment and denied the subdividers1 motions. 
The trial court found that the Plaintiffs failed to 
file a Notice of Claim within 90 days after their cause of 
action arose, and that they failed to initiate their 
litigation within one-year after their cause of action arose. 
In addition, the court determined that the "Doctrine of 
Equitable Tolling" had not been adopted by the State of Utah. 
Therefore, the Court concluded that the Plaintiffs1 claims 
were barred by the statute of limitation, and because they 
failed to comply with the Notice of Claim requirement. (Ex. 
"B", Addendum) 
The plaintiff subdividers timely appealed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 21, 1975, the City of West Jordan amended 
Ordinance No. 33 by adding Section 9-C-8(a) (herein called 
the "Ordinance") requiring subdividers to dedicate seven 
percent (7%) of land area or equivalent value in cash. If 
the City elected to accept money instead of land, payment was 
required on or before the approval of the subdivision plat by 
the City Council. Call v. City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217, 
218 (Utah 1979). 
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On November 3, 1977, notice of claim and demand for 
refund of monies paid under the Ordinance, was sent to the 
West Jordan Mayor and City Council. R. 251-252. The notice 
was sent on behalf of John Call, Clark Jenkins, and "all 
other similarly situated" who were required to dedicate land 
or to pay cash under the Ordinance. (Id.) 
The City of West Jordan received the notice, and 
copies were distributed to the Mayor, members of the City 
Council, the City Manager, the City Attorney, and the City 
Recorder. R. 261. 
The notice stated that a class action would be 
commenced if the City refused to refund the impact fees. 
R. 252. 
On February 7, 1978, a class action complaint for 
declaratory judgment and other relief was filed on behalf of 
Call, Jenkins, and "all others similarly situated" against 
the City of West Jordan. The asserted class included "all 
persons, partnerships, businesses and corporations which 
have, or will be required, to either dedicate . . . land 
. . . or the equivalent in cash to the Defendant in 
accordance with Ordinance No. 33 of West Jordan, Utah and the 
amendment thereto adding Section 9-C-8." (Complaint, Call 
case, supra.) 
Covecrest Properties is a Utah limited partnership 
whose initial limited partners included minor children who 
have not all reached the age of majority. R. 271. Covecrest 
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developed the West Jordan subdivisions named Vista Via I, II 
and III. R. 272. 
In January 1978, $6,714.97 was required to be paid as 
an impact fee, pursuant to the Ordinance before the City 
would approve development of Vista Via I subdivision. (Id.) 
In June 1978, Covecrest applied to the City of West Jordan 
for approvals of contiguous subdivisions called Vista Via II 
and III. Prior to granting its approval, the City required 
Covecrest to pay $12,169.25, pursuant to the Ordinance. 
(Id.) 
In addition to the cash payments, the City required 
flood control improvements to be installed at Covecrest's 
cost, pursuant to the Ordinance. These improvements included 
storm drains, drain fields, ditches, both onsite and offsite 
piping which cost Covecrest in excess of $50,000. R. 272-
273. 
In connection with the Call case, the City 
investigated the facts and circumstances involved with the 
receipt of impact fees, and the improvements they required to 
be made by subdividers, under the Ordinance. R. 276-283. 
The Utah Supreme Court determined that West Jordan 
Ordinance No. 33, Section 9-C-8, was void ab initio. Call v. 
City of West Jordan. 727 P.2d 180 (Utah 7-23-86, rehearing 
denied 10-29-86). The Court also determined that the trial 
court had not abused its discretion in refusing class action 
status. The Court said: 
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We are here dealing with a class whose 
members have been identified. They are 
developers engaged in business whose claims 
are not so insubstantial that joinder or 
individual suits would not merit the cost. 
It is unlikely that denial of class action 
status would preclude them from pursuing 
their remedies. . . . Because of our ruling 
on the merits of the case, there is no 
possibility of inconsistent judgments and no 
issue of substantial public interest remains. 
Call v. Citv of West Jordan, 727 P.2d 180, 183-184 (Utah 
1986). 
On November 5, 1987, the Third Judicial District 
Court entered its Ruling, Order and Judgment in the Call 
case, directing the City of West Jordan to refund the impact 
fees, together with interest, to the Plaintiffs in that case, 
R. 285. 
Within three weeks, on November 24, 1987, Covecrest 
filed its lawsuit for refund of the impact fees. (Ex. "C", 
Addendum) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I 
Claims against a City, for refund of money that was 
collected and retained by mistake or without authority, are 
exempt from the notice requirement contained in Utah's 
Governmental Immunity Act. Even if the Utah Supreme Court 
had not previously decided that issue, the City received 
adequate notice of the subdividers1 claims in 1977, when 
certain subdividers sent notice for themselves and others 
similarly situated. 
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In addition, a class action complaint was filed 
against the City in 1979. In connection therewith, the City 
researched all facts and circumstances concerning impact fees 
charged, received, and used. The fact that no additional 
notice was given, before the appellant-subdividers filed 
suit, did not result in any prejudice to the City. 
II 
The statute of limitation applicable to the 
subdividers' action is Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25 (1989), 
providing a four year time frame to commence actions on an 
implied contract (El Rancho Enterprises. Inc. v. Murray City 
Corp., 565 P.2d 778, 779-780 (Utah 1977)), or actions for 
relief not otherwise provided for by law. 
The subdividers1 cause of action to recover impact 
fees paid under an ordinance that was adjudged to be void, 
did not accrue before this Court determined the ordinance to 
be void ab initio, in 1986. 
By filing suit in 1987, subdivider Covecrest 
Properties commenced its action timely. 
Ill 
Should the Court determine that the subdividers1 
cause of action accrued prior to 1986, or that a shorter 
period of limitation is applicable, then justice and equity 
require a finding that the statute was tolled. 
There are at least four separate and distinct reasons 
for tolling the period of limitation. First, there was a 
8 
concurrent appeal of the same or similar matter in the Call 
case. Second, the Call case had been filed as a class action 
complaint. Third, with respect to Covecrest, the statute 
should be tolled during the minority of its limited partners. 
Fourth, the "Doctrine of Equitable Tolling" should be applied 
to promote justice, do equity, and encourage judicial economy 
by avoiding duplicitous and unnecessary litigation. 
IY 
The trial court erred in denying the subdividers1 
motion to strike the City's affirmative defenses of mistake, 
estoppel, waiver, laches, and unjust enrichment, because they 
are unavailable to a municipality that collects and retains 
money that is paid under an invalid ordinance. If such 
defenses were available, the City failed to offer or produce 
any evidence of their having a factual basis, and the 




SUBDIVIDERS WERE NOT REQUIRED TO FILE A 
NOTICE OF CLAIM UNDER UTAH'S GOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITY ACT, BEFORE FILING SUIT AGAINST THE 
CITY TO RECOVER IMPACT FEES COLLECTED UNDER 
AN ORDINANCE THAT THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
DETERMINED TO BE VOID AB INITIO. IF NOTICE 
WAS REQUIRED, IT WAS ADEQUATELY GIVEN AND THE 
CITY WAS NOT PREJUDICED. 
Covecrest was not required to give notice to the City 
of West Jordan before filing this lawsuit. Equitable claims, 
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and claims for the refund of monies paid to a city under 
mistake or without authority of law, are exempt from the 
notice requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, 
contained in Utah Code Ann. §63-30-11 (1990) Jenkins v. Swan, 
675 P.2d 1145, 1154 (Utah 1983); El Rancho Enterprises v. 
Murray Citv Corp. 565 P.2d 778, 780 (Utah 1977). 
The Utah Supreme Court has said: 
In El Rancho Enterprises, Inc. v. Murray City Corp., 
Utah 565 P.2d 778, 779 (1977), we said that the 
"common law exception to governmental immunity 
pertaining to equitable claims has long been 
recognized in this jurisdiction." We held that 
neither the passage of time nor the enactment of the 
Governmental Immunity Act has eroded that principal. 
Id. at 780. In 1978 the statutory section 
authorizing the suit in El Rancho, . . . was repealed 
and such claims are now covered exclusively by the 
Governmental Immunity Act. . . these amendments to 
not undermine the continued viability of our holding 
in El Rancho, that equitable claims of this nature 
for assessments made "without authority of law," are 
exempt from the notice requirements. El Rancho, at 
780. Because this holding is predicated on the 
common law exception to governmental immunity for 
equitable claims, such claims are also exempt from 
the undertaking requirements of the Governmental 
Immunity Act. 
Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1154 (Utah 1983). 
Even if the Utah Supreme Court had not previously 
decided this issue, and the notice requirement were 
determined to be applicable in this case, it was satisfied. 
Notice was sent to the Defendant on November 3, 1977. R. 
251-252. It was received and copies were provided to the 
Mayor, City Council, and various public officials. R. 261. 
In addition, notice was given to the Defendant, by 
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commencement of a class action lawsuit, February 7, 1978, on 
behalf of all subdividers who paid, or who would have been 
required to pay, impact fees pursuant to Ordinance No. 33. 
Call v. Citv of West Jordan. 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979). 
Affirmance of the denial of class action status was in 1986. 
Call v. Citv of West Jordan. 727 P.2d 180 (Utah 1985). 
The purpose for written notice is to enable the 
governmental body to investigate the facts while the evidence 
is relatively fresh. The City received timely notice and had 
full opportunity to investigate the facts pertinent to the 
present lawsuit. R.276-283. No legitimate purpose would 
have been served by Covecrest sending an additional notice of 
claim, and the City was not prejudiced. The City was not 
prejudiced because Covecrest did not file an additional 
notice of claim. 
Another reason why the notice requirement of the Act 
should not bar Covecrest's claim, is because the limited 
partners have always included the same minor children. R. 
271. The Utah Supreme Court has held that time limitations 
are tolled during minority, and this also applies to the 
notice requirements of the Act. The Court has said: 
. . .[A] minor claimant is justly entitled to the 
protection afforded by said section 78-12-36(1) 
U.C.A. 1953f in all cases, including notice 
requirements of the type contained in the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. To hold otherwise is a 
denial of due process and equal protection. 
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Scott v. School Bd. of Granite Sch. Dist.. 568 P.2d 746, 748 
(Utah 1977). 
II 
THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATION ALLOWS 
FOUR YEARS IN WHICH TO COMMENCE AN ACTION TO 
RECOVER IMPACT FEES COLLECTED AND RETAINED BY 
THE CITY THROUGH MISTAKE OR WITHOUT 
AUTHORITY. UTAH CODE ANN, §78-12-25 (1989). 
THE SUBDIVIDERS1 CAUSE OF ACTION DID NOT 
ACCRUE UNTIL THE COURT DETERMINED THE IMPACT 
FEE ORDINANCE TO BE VOID AB INITIO IN 1986, 
AND COVECREST COMMENCED ITS SUIT TIMELY IN 
1987. 
This lawsuit is not a challenge to the validity of 
the subject Ordinance. That issue was decided in 1986. Call 
v. City of West Jordan. 727 P.2d 180 (Utah 1986). 
This lawsuit is an action to recover fees that the 
City required of the subdividers, without authority. This 
Court has determined that actions to recover money received 
by a municipality by mistake or without authority of law, are 
subject to Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25 (1989). That Statute 
requires actions upon a contract not in writing or for 
actions not otherwise provided for by law, to be commenced 
within four years. Ponderosa One v. Salt Lake City Sub. San. 
P., 738 P.2d 635 (Utah, 1987); El Rancho Enterprises v. 
Murray Citv Corp.. 565 P.2d 778 (Utah 1977). The Court has 
said: 
If the City obtained the money of another by mistake, 
or without authority of law, it is her duty to refund 
it—not from any contract entered into by her on the 
subject, but from the general obligation to do 
justice which binds all persons, whether natural or 
artificial. If the City obtain other property which 
does not belong to her, it is her duty to restore it; 
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or if used by her, to render an equivalent to the 
true owner from the like general obligation. In 
these cases she does not, in fact, make any promise 
on the subject but the law, which always intends 
justice, implies one; and her liability thus arising 
is said to be a liability on an implied contract. 
El Rancho Enterprises, Inc. v. Murray Citv Corp. 565 P.2d 
778, 779-780 (Utah 1977). 
The four-year period of limitation began to run 
either in July 1986, when the Ordinance was held to be void 
ab initio, or in October 1986 when the Utah Supreme Court 
denied rehearing in the Call case, or in November 1987 when 
the Third Judicial District Court finally concluded that 
case. R. 285. Covecrest filed this lawsuit within three 
weeks, on November 24, 1987. Exhibit "C". Covecrest contends 
that its action was filed timely. 
It would be illogical and inequitable to find that 
the subdividers1 cause of action, for a refund under a void 
Ordinance, accrued prior to the Court's determination that 
the Ordinance was void. As this Court has said: 
To say that a cause of action accrues to a 
person when she may maintain an action 
thereon and, at the same time, that it 
accrues before she has or can reasonably be 
expected to have knowledge of any wrong 
inflicted upon her is patently inconsistent 
and unrealistic. She cannot maintain an 
action before she knows she has one. To say 
to one who has been wronged, "You had a 
remedy, but before the wrong was 
ascertainable to you, the law stripped you of 
your remedy,11 makes a mockery of the law. 
Foil v. Ballincxer, 601 P.2d 144, 148-149 (Utah 1979), quoting 
from Berrv v. Branner, 245 Or. 307, 421 P.2d 996, 998 (1966). 
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Ill 
IF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATION BEGAN TO RUN 
PRIOR TO 1986, THEN JUSTICE AND EQUITY 
REQUIRE A FINDING THAT IT WAS TOLLED, MAKING 
COVECREST'S LAWSUIT TIMELY. 
If the Court determines that the period of limitation 
began to run prior to 1986, then justice and equity demanded 
a tolling of the statute. 
There are at least four separate grounds for tolling 
the statute. First, a period of limitation should be tolled, 
during the appeal of a matter involving the same or similar 
issue. The purpose is to assure that claimants are not 
deprived of potentially valid suits by appeals that are not 
resolved until after the applicable periods of limitation 
run. See, e.g., Guthiel v. Gilmer. 27 Utah 296, 508, 76 P. 
628, 632 (1904) decided under Section 2893, revised statutes 
1898, a predecessor to U.C.A., Section 78-12-40; and see 
Madsen v. Borthick. 769 P.2d 245, 254 (Utah, 1988). 
A second reason why the Call case, 727 P.2d 180 (Utah 
1986), should be considered to have tolled the running of the 
limitation period, is because it was filed as a class action. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that commencement of 
a class action suspends the applicable statute of limitations 
as to all asserted members of the class who would have been 
parties, had the action been permitted to continue as a class 
action. American Pipe and Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 
538, 38 L.Ed.2d 713, 94 S.Ct. 756 (1974). The rule 
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pronounced by the Court is that the period of limitation is 
suspended for both those who were aware, and those were 
unaware, of the proceeding brought in their interest, and 
even if they do not rely upon the proceedings. Xd., 414 U.S. 
551, 553-554. The reasons for the rule are to preserve 
justice, do equity, and to avoid duplicity of litigation. 
Id. When the purported class is representative of the 
claims, the defendant has notice and an opportunity to gather 
evidence, and the statute of limitation should not bar 
recovery by the plaintiffs. Id., p. 555. 
A third reason why the statute of limitation should 
be tolled, as to Covecrest Properties, is because its limited 
partners have not yet reached the age of majority. R. 271. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-36 (1989) suspends a period of 
limitation for those under the age of majority. The 
Covecrest limited partners were the same limited partners in 
1978 when the impact fees were paid. Minors are also exempt 
from the notice requirements of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. Scott v. School Bd. of Granite Sch. Dist., 568 
P.2d 746, 748 (Utah 1977). 
A fourth reason compelling a finding that the 
Plaintiffs1 action was not time barred, is found in 
application of the "Equitable Tolling Doctrine." 
Instead, the City continued its defense of the Call 
case, by arguing statutes of limitation, estoppel, unjust 
enrichment, mistake and waiver. Those defenses failed. 
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The purpose and object of statutes of limitations are 
to allow a defendant to research facts pertaining to the 
lawsuit while they are relatively fresh. Collier v. City of 
Pasadena, 191 Cal.Rptr. 681 (App. 1983). They should not be 
used to thwart justice or equity. 
To prevent injustices caused by strict and narrow 
reading of statutes of limitations, courts have applied with 
increased frequency, the "Doctrine of Equitable Tolling." 
The Doctrine is used to toll the statute of limitations for a 
plaintiff, pending the outcome of a similar lawsuit. 
Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 64 S.Ct. 
582, 88 L.Ed. 788 (1944); Collier, supra. 
The doctrine of "equitable tolling" is 
supported by several important policy 
considerations. First, it secures the 
benefits of the statutes of limitation for 
defendants without imposing the costs of 
forfeiture on plaintiffs. (Cite omit) 
Secondly, it avoids the hardship upon 
plaintiffs of being compelled to pursue 
simultaneously several duplicative actions on 
the same set of facts. (Cite omit) Thirdly, 
it lessens the costs incurred by courts and 
other dispute resolution tribunals, at least 
where a disposition in the case filed in one 
forum may render the proceeding in the second 
unnecessary or easier and cheaper to resolve. 
(Cite omit) 
Collier v. Citv of Pasadena, 191 Cal.Rptr. 681, 686-687 (App. 
1983) . 
There is a three-pronged test for invoking the 
doctrine. The elements of this test are: (1) timely notice 
to the defendant in filing the first claim; (2) a lack of 
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prejudice to defendant in gathering evidence to defend 
against the second claim; and (3) good faith and reasonable 
conduct by the plaintiff in filing the second claim. Id. 
In 1986, the Utah Supreme Court determined Ordinance 
33, Section 9-C-8, to be "invalid and void ab initio" (Call, 
supra, 727 P.2d at 183). That decision placed the City under 
a duty to refund the impact fees that had been unlawfully 
obtained. (See El Rancho, supra, 565 P.2d at 779-780 for 
duty to refund monies obtained by mistake or without 
authority of law.) 
The criteria for application of the Doctrine of 
Equitable Tolling were satisfied by the undisputed facts and 
circumstances in this action. 
First, the notice requirement was satisfied because 
Defendant received timely notice in November 1977, and by the 
subsequent filing of the Call case as a class action. 
Second, the City's ability to gather evidence was not 
prejudiced, because it gathered all relevant evidence in 
connection with the Call case. R. 276-283. The City was 
placed in a position to fairly defend this action. 
Defendant's own evidence, gathered in connection with Call, 
and presented to the trial court, sets forth the amounts paid 
by Covecrest Properties, and refers to improvements required 
of Covecrest under Ordinance No. 33. R. 276-283. There 
cannot be any other evidence that is relevant to the City 
being required to refund the impact fees paid under the 
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Ordinance. As the Court said in Call, supra, 727 P.2d 180, 
183-184 (Utah 1986), "there is no possibility of inconsistent 
judgments and no issue of substantial public interest 
remains." 
The third criteria for application of the doctrine is 
good faith and reasonable conduct by the Plaintiff in filing 
the second claim. Covecrest satisfied this requirement by 
filing this lawsuit within a reasonable time after this Court 
nullified the Ordinance, and promptly after final disposition 
of the Call case. 
The Equitable Tolling Doctrine has been applied to 
defenses raised under governmental immunity acts. Such acts 
should not be used to thwart justice or equity. Governmental 
immunity does not pertain to equitable claims. El Rancho 
Enterprises v. Murray City Corp.. 566 P.2d 778 (Utah 1977). 
In the El Rancho case, the Utah Supreme Court stated 
that common law exceptions to the Governmental Immunity Act, 
pertaining to equitable claims, have been long recognized in 
this jurisdiction. Id. Those exceptions have in no way been 
eroded by the passage of time or by the enactment of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 
1154 (Utah 1983). 
An important rationale for invoking the Doctrine of 
Equitable Tolling, to suspend a time bar, is that Congress 
would not wish a plaintiff deprived of his rights when no 
policy underlying a statute is served in doing so. Burnett 
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V, N.Y. Rv. Co,, 380 U.S. 424, 434, 85 S.Ct. 1050, 1058 
(1965). Furthermore, a plaintiff should not be barred by a 
statute of limitations unless the defendant would be unfairly 
prejudiced if the plaintiff were allowed to proceed. See 
Collier, supra at 684. 
In this action, the City has not been prejudiced by 
the passage of time. There are no statutory objectives or 
public policy to be served by denying the claims of the 
subdividers. 
IY 
THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES OF MISTAKE, 
ESTOPPEL, WAIVER, LACHES, AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT ARE NOT AVAILABLE TO A 
MUNICIPALITY THAT COLLECTS FEES WITHOUT 
AUTHORITY. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
THE SUBDIVIDERS1 MOTION TO STRIKE SUCH 
DEFENSES. 
Covecrest will not duplicate the authorities and 
arguments of the other Appellant-subdividers, with respect to 
why the affirmative defenses should be denied to the City. 
Covecrest joins in such arguments, and has hereinabove 
adapted the brief of the other subdividers. Covecrest 
contributes the following supplemental argument. 
To prove laches, the City must show that (a) the 
subdividers unreasonably delayed in bringing the action; and 
(b) that the City was prejudiced by that delay. Papanicolas 
Brothers Enterprises v. Sugar House Shopping Center 
Association. 535 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1975). 
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The City had a full and timely opportunity to 
investigate the facts of this case* R. 276-283. The City 
was not prejudiced by the subdividers1 promptly filing their 
action, after the Call case concluded. 
No genuine issue of material fact exists with respect 
to the claimed defenses. As argued to the trial Court, the 
subdividers performed discovery of the City, and found no 
evidence of any factual basis to the defenses claimed by the 
City. TR. 20, R. 267-268, R. 258-260. 
CONCLUSION 
The notice requirement of Utah's Governmental 
Immunity Act is inapplicable to the subdividers' claims. If 
notice was required, the Court should find that it was 
satisfied. 
The statute of limitation applicable to this lawsuit 
is Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25, allowing a four-year period in 
which to commence an action. Covecrest's cause of action did 
not accrue until 1986, when the Court determined the 
Ordinance to be void ab initio. 
If the Court determines that the period of limitation 
began to run, prior to 1986, then justice and equity require 
a finding that the statute was tolled. The City made a 
timely investigation of the facts, and it has not been 
prejudiced. 
The subdividers1 rights to a refund should not be 
deemed forfeited. 
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WHEREFORE, Covecrest Properties asks the Court to 
reverse the trial court's Order, Ruling and Judgment in this 
matter, and to remand the case with instructions to enter 
judgment in favor of the Plaintiff-Appellants for refund of 
the impact fees they paid, with interest. In addition, 
Covecrest asks the Court to award costs to the Appellants, 
and for such other and further relief as deemed just in the 
premises. 
DATED t h i s 23c/&*V o f J u l y , 1990 . 
MARTIN & BIGELOW, P.C. 
x==Bel S. Martin" 
Attorneys for Covecrest 
Properties 
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ADDENDUM 
A. STATUTES & RULES 
B. ORDER 
C. COMPLAINT AND AMENDED COMPLAINT 
A. STATUTES & RULES 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 63-30-11 
Municipal liability tor negligent fire lnbpec-
tion and subsequent enforcement, 69 A L R 4th 
739 
Applicability of libel and slander exception 
to waiver of sovereign immunity under Federal 
Tort Claims Act (28 USCS & 2680(h)), 79 
A L R Fed 826 
Applicability of 28 USCS i* 2680(a) and 
2680(h) to Federal Tort Claims Act liability 
arising out of government informant's conduct, 
85 A L R Fed 848 
63-30-10.5. Waiver of immunity for taking private prop-
erty without compensation-
CD Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for the recov-
ery of compensation from the governmental entity when the governmental 
entity has taken or damaged private property without just compensation. 
(2) Compensation and damages shall be assessed according to the require-
ments of Chapter 34, Title 78 
History: C. 1953, 63-30-10.5, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 75, § 3. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Development 
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Civil Pro-
cedure, 1989 Utah L Rev 166 
63-30-11. Claim for injury — Notice — Contents — Service 
— Legal disability. 
(1) A claim arises when the statute of limitations that would apply if the 
claim were against a private person begins to run 
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity, or 
against an employee for an act or omission occuiiing during the performance 
of his duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority bhall 
file a written notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an action, 
regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is character-
ized as governmental 
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth. 
(l) a brief statement of the factb, 
(n) the nature of the claim asserted, and 
(in) the damages incuired by the claimant so far as they are 
known. 
(b) The notice of claim shall be signed by the person making the claim 
or that person's agent, attorney, parent, or legal guardian, and shall be 
directed and delivered to the responsible governmental entity accoiding 
to the requirements of Section 63-30-12 or 63-30-13 
(4) (a) If the claimant is under the age of majority, mentally incompetent 
and without a legal guardian, or imprisoned at the time the claim arises, 
Validity and construction ot statute autho-
rizing or requiring governmental unit to in-
demnify public officer or employee for liability 
arising out of performance of public duties, 71 
A L R 3d 90 
Governmental tort liability for failure to pro-
vide police protection to specifically threatened 
crime victim, 46 A L R 4th 948 
Failure to restrain drunk driver as ground of 
liability of state or local governmental unit or 
officer, 48 A L R 4th 287 
Liability of hospital or sanitarium for negli-
gence of physician or surgeon, 51 A L R 4th 
235 
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63-30-11 STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
the claimant may apply to the court to extend the time for service of 
notice of claim 
(b) (i) After hearing and notice to the governmental entity, the court 
may extend the time for service of notice of claim. 
(ii) The court may not grant an extension that exceeds the applica-
ble statute of limitations. 
(c) In determining whether or not to grant an extension, the court shall 
consider whether the delay in serving the notice of claim will substan-
tially prejudice the governmental entity in maintaining its defense on the 
merits. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 11; 1978, ch. 
27, * 5; 1983, ch. 131, $ 1; 1987, ch. 75, § 4. 
Amendment Note. — The 1987 amend 
merit, in Subsection (2), added 'before main-
taining an action, regardless of whether or not 
the function giving rise to the claim is charac-
terized as governmental" to the end of the sub-
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality 
Action based on exercise of governmental func-
tion 
Assignment of municipal debt 
Clear statement of claims required 
Conditions for right to recover 
Damages not specified 
Failure to file claim 
Notice 
Sufficiency of notice 
Waiver of objections by city 
Cited 
Constitutionality. 
Functions of the notice of claim requirement 
in giving the affected governmental entity an 
opportunity to promptly investigate and rem-
edy defects immediately, in avoiding unneces-
sary litigation, and in minimizing difficulties 
which might attend changes in administration 
provide sufficient justification for its imposi-
tion as to governmental but not other tort-fea-
sors, and therefore this section does not consti-
tute a denial of equal protection Sears v 
Southworth, 563 P 2d 192 (Utah 1977) 
Action based on exercise of governmental 
function. 
Action against state which was predicated 
on governmental supervision of financial insti-
tutions involved the exercise of a governmen-
tal function and was barred where there was 
no compliance with the notice of claim provi-
sions of §§ 63-30-11 and 63-30-12 Madsen v 
Borthick, 658 P2d 627 (Utah 1983) 
Assignment of municipal debt 
Assignment directing city to pay debt it owes 
section, added the subsection designations 
within Subsections (3) and (4), in Subsection 
(4)(a), added "at the time the claim arises, the 
claimant may apply to the court to extend the 
time for service of notice of claim", and made 
minor changes in phraseology and punctuation 
throughout the section 
assignor to assignee is not kind of claim re-
quired to be submitted to city in accordance 
with this statute Cooper v Holder, 21 Utah 2d 
40, 440 P2d 15 (1968) (decided under former 
law) 
Clear statement of claims required. 
The purpose of this section is to require 
every claimant to state clearly all of the ele-
ments of his claims to the board of commis-
sioners or city council for allowance as a condi-
tion precedent to his right to sue the city and 
recover his damages in an ordinary action 
Sweet v Salt Lake City, 43 Utah 306, 134 P 
1167 (1913) 
Conditions for right to recover. 
Statutory right to recover can be availed of 
only when there has been a compliance with 
the conditions upon which right is conferred 
One who seeks to enforce the right must by 
allegation and proof bring himself within the 
conditions prescribed thereby Hamilton v Salt 
Lake City, 99 Utah 362, 106 P 2d 1028 (1940) 
Damages not specified. 
A claim which stated the time, place and 
general nature of the injury and the sidewalk 
defect causing it fulfilled the purpose of former 
section even though the amount of damages 
was not stated, since the claim had to be filed 
within thirty days of the injury, the exact 
amount of damages was impossible to ascer-
tain Spencer v Salt Lake City, 17 Utah 2d 
362, 412 P 2d 449 (1966) (decided under former 
law) 
Failure to file claim. 
Where no claim was filed as required by this 
section, action to recover moneys expended to 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 78-12-25 
Promises or attempts by seller to repuir Key Numbers. — Limitation of Actions *=» 
goods as tolling statute of limitations for 24, 25 
breach of warranty, 68 A.L.R.3d 1277. 
78-12-24 Actions against public officers — Within six 
years. 
An action by the state or any agency or public corporation thereof against 
any public officer for malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance in office or 
against any surety upon his official bond may be brought within six years 
after such officer ceases to hold his office, but not thereafter. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, Misconduct by public servants, §§ 76-8-201, 
Supp., 104-12-24. 76-8-202. 
Cross-References. — Governmental Immu-
nity Act, § 63-30-1 et seq 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 53 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions Key Numbers. — Limitation of Actions «=» 
§ 82 et seq. 58(2) 
78-12-25. Within four years. 
Within four years: 
(1) an action upon a contract, obligation or liability not founded upon 
an instrument in writing; also on an open account for goods, wares and 
merchandise, and for any article charged in a store account; also on an 
open account for work, labor or services rendered, or materials furnished; 
provided, that action in all of the foregoing cases may be commenced at 
any time within four years after the last charge is made or the last 
payment is received. 
(2) an action for relief not otherwise provided for by law. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, Product Liability Act, statute of limitations, 
Supp., 104-12-25. & 78-15-3 
Cross-References. — Antitrust Act actions, 
§ 76-10-925 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Assigned cause of action 
Breach of fiduciary duty 
Damage of private property for public use. 
Divorce actions 
Excessive freight charges 
Extension of period 
Federal civil rights actions 
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78-12-25 JUDICIAL CODE 
In action against contractors for defective 
construction, the six-year limitation period of 
Subsection (2) applied rather than the three-
year limitation of Subsection 78-12-26(1) be-
cause plaintiff asserted liability based entirely 
on written instruments, including contracts. 
Brigham Young Univ. v. Paulsen Constr. Co., 
744 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1987). 
Running of statute. 
—Settlement agreement. 
Under a settlement agreement, the defen-
dant was to have sold certain property and dis-
A.L.R. — Limitations of actions applicable 
to action by trustees of employee benefit plan 
to enforce delinquent employer contributions 
78-12-25. Within four years. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, $ 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-12-25; L. 1988, ch. 59, 5 14. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment, effective April 25, 1988, inserted Subsec-
ANALYSIS 
Conflict of laws. 
Constitutionality. 
Federal civil rights actions. 
Malpractice. 
Open account. 
Other claims for relief. 
—Federal claim. 
Cited. 
Conflict of laws. 
Trial court properly extended comity so as to 
tributed the proceeds by a certain date. There-
fore, a cause of action accrued when that date 
passed and the defendant had not sold the 
property. Butcher v. Gilroy, 744 P.2d 311 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Tolling. 
—Concealment or misleading. 
Proof of concealment or misleading by the 
defendant precludes the defendant, in an ac-
tion under a settlement agreement, from rais-
ing the statute of limitations defense. Butcher 
v. Gilroy, 744 P.2d 311 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
under ERISA (29 USCS § 1132(a)), 90 A.L.R. 
Fed. 374. 
tion (2); redesignated former Subsection (2) as 
Subsection (3); and made minor stylistic 
changes in Subsection (1). 
apply the two-year limitations provision of the 
California Governmental Claims Act, rather 
than this section, to a complaint alleging in-
jury sustained in an emergency landing of a 
helicopter owned by a California governmental 
entity. Jackett v. Los Angeles Dep't of Water & 
Power, 771 P.2d 1074 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Constitutionality. 
Subsection (3) does not violate the open 
courts provision of the Utah constitution. 
McHenry v. Utah Valley Hosp., 724 F. Supp. 
835 (D. Utah 1989). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Within four years: 
(1) An action upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon 
an instrument in writing; also on an open account for goods, wares, and 
merchandise, and for any article charged on a store account; also on an 
open account for work, labor or services rendered, or materials furnished; 
provided, that action in all of the foregoing cases may be commenced at 
any time within four years after the last charge is made or the last 
payment is received. 
(2) A claim for relief or a cause of action under the following sections of 
Chapter 6, Title 25, the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act: 
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(a), which in specific situations limits the 
time for action to one year, under Section 25-6-10; 
(b) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b); or 
(c) Subsection 25-6-6(1). 
(3) An action for relief not otherwise provided for by law. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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78-12-36 JUDICIAL CODE 
—Defendant's family. 
The full time that the debtor is out of the 
state must be excluded in computing the time, 
notwithstanding fact that debtor's family mav 
have residence or place of abode in state and 
that service of process could be made upon 
some member of debtor's family at its residence 
or place of abode Keith-O'Brien Co v Snyder, 
51 Utah 227, 169 P 954 (1917) 
—Statute tolled. 
Maintenance of residence within state with 
persons living therein did not prevent tolling of 
statute of limitations Buell v Duchesne Mer-
cantile Co, 64 Utah 391, 231 P 123 (1924) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reason-
able Assurance of Actual Notice Required for 
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah Gra-
ham v Sawaya, 1981 B Y U L Rev 937, 945 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 51 Am Jur 2d Limitation 
of Actions § 154 et seq 
C.J.S. — 54 C J S Limitations of Actions 
§ 211 
A.L.R. — Tolling of statute of limitations 
during absence from state as affected by fact 
that party claiming benefit of limitations re-
mained subject to service during absence or 
nonresidence, 55 A L R 3d 1158 
Key Numbers. — Limitation of Actions «=> 
84, 85 
78-12-36. Effect of disability. 
If a person entitled to bring an action, other than for the recovery of real 
property, is at the time the cause of action accrued, either under the age of 
majority or mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian, the time of 
the disability is not a part of the time limited for the commencement of the 
action. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-1236; L. 1975, ch. 67, § 16; 1987, 
ch. 19, § 5. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment deleted the subsection references in this 
section as set out in the bound volume, and 
deleted "imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in 
execution under the sentence of a criminal 
court, for a term less than for life" following 
"without a legal guardian" and made minor 
changes in phraseology and punctuation 
throughout the section 
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1987, ch 19, § 6 
provides that the amendment to this section 
applies only to causes of action that arise after 
April 27, 1987 and has no retroactive applica-
tion 
Cross-References. — Actions to recover 
real property, effect of disability, § 78-12-21 
Age of majority, § 15-2-1 
Disaffirmance of contract by minor, 
S§ 15-2-2, 15-2-3 
Guardians of incapacitated persons, 
§ 75 5-301 et seq 
Medical malpractice actions, limitations pro-
visions applicable regardless of disability, 
§ 78-14-4 
Product Liability Act, limitations provisions 
applicable regardless of disability, § 78-15-3 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Notice of claim requirements 
—Failure to file 
Action barred 







UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 56 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reuson- Opening default or default judgment claimed 
able Abburante of Actual Notice Required for to have been obtained becaube of attorney's 
In Perbonam Default Judgment in Utah Gra- mistake as to time or place of appearance, 
ham v Sawaya, 1981 B Y U L Rev 937
 t r l a l > o r f l l m g o f n e c e Ssary papers, 21 A L R 3d 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am Jur 2d Judgments ^ 5 5 




lXur? to gf lve K n o t l c e f a P P h c a t l o n f d f 
A.L.R. - Necessity of taking proof as to ha- fault J ^ * ™ ^ "*e™ «J° }"»0Ib r e q U i r e d ° n l y 
bihty against defaulting defendant, 8 A L R 3d b v custom, 28 A L R 3d 1383 
1070 Failure of party or his attorney to appear at 
Appealability of order setting aside, or refus- pretrial conference, 55 A L R 3d 303 
mg to set aside, default judgment, 8 A L R 3d Default judgments against the United States 
1272 under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and Procedure, 55 A L R Fed 190 
hearing as to determination of amount of dam- Key Numbers. — Judgment <*=» 92 to 134 
ages, 15 A L R 3d 586 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits The judgment bought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to mtei rogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
othei lehef lb not in controversy, and dnecting such fuither pioceedings in the 
action as are just Upon the trial of the action the factb so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
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Rule 56 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him 
(0 When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Cross-References. — Contempt generally, 
Rule 56, F R C P §§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq 
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B c ORDER 
STEPHEN G HOMER (1536) 
West Jordan City Attorney 
P 0 Box 428 
West Jordan, Utah 84084 
Telephone 561-1463 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
AMERICAN TIERRA CORPORATION et a l , ] 
P l a i n t i f f s ] 
vs ] 
THE CITY OF WEST JORDAN, UTAH, ] 
Defendant 
) ORDER, RULING AND JUDGMENT 
) C i v i l No. C 87-7679 
I C i v i l No. C 87-7680 
) C i v i l No. C 87-7681 
I C i v i l No. C 87-7682 
) C i v i l No. C 88-4700 
) [Cases assigned to Judge Pat Brian] 
The Cour t , having read the Memoranda o f Law submitted by Counsel and on 
February 2 1 , 1990, having heard o r a l argument on the mat ter and being f u l l y 
appr ised of the i s s u e s , now en te rs the f o l l o w i n g F ind ings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law: 
1 . The ind i v idua l P l a i n t i f f s f a i l ed to f i l e a "no t ice of c la im" w i th in 90 
days a f te r t he i r causes of act ion arose. 
2 . The i n d i v i d u a l P l a i n t i f f s f a i l ed to f i l e t h e i r l i t i g a t i o n w i th in the 
one year "s ta tu te of l i m i t a t i o n " period a f te r t h e i r cause of act ion arose. 
3 . The d o c t r i n e o f " e q u i t a b l e t o l l i n g " has not been adopted by the S ta te 
o f U tah , 
Based upon t h e f o r e g o i n g F i n d i n g s o f Fac t and Conc lus ions o f Law, IT IS 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1 . Defendant 's Mot ion f o r P a r t i a l Summary Judgment i s g r a n t e d . The c la ims 
o f t he i n d i v i d u a l P l a i n t i f f s are bar red by (1) s t a t u t e s o f l i m i t a t i o n and ( 2 ) 
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t he f a i l u r e of the i n d i v i d u a l P l a i n t i f f s to comply wi th the "not ice of c la im" 
s ta tu tes . 
2. P l a i n t i f f s ' Cross-Mot ion f o r Summary Judgment to s t r i k e Defendant's 
a f f i rma t i ve defenses i s denied. 
3. P l a i n t i f f s ' Cross-Mot ion f o r Summary Judgment to s t r i k e Defendant's 
" s ta tu te of l i m i t a t i o n s " defenses i s denied. 
4 . Counsel f o r the Defendant i s d i r e c t e d to prepare the approp r ia te 
w r i t t en order r e f l e c t i n g t h i s ru l i ng and judgment and submit the same to t he 
Court not l a t e r than March 2, 1990. 
The Clerk o f the Court i s d i r ec ted to s t r i k e from the t r i a l calendar the 
three-day j u r y t r i a l i n t h i s case, scheduled to begin on March 26 th . 
Entered t h i s ff day of March, 1990. 
BY THE COURT:~} 
aJ- 1 
PAT B BRIAN 
Judge of the D i s t r i c t Court 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
GORDON K JENSEN, Attorney for P l a i n t i f f 
MEL S MARTIN, Attorney for P l a i n t i f f 
CERTIFICATE 
I c e r t i f y tha t I caused to be transmit ted by telephonic facs imi le machine a copy 
o f the fo rego ing ORDER, RULING AND JUDGMENT to Mr Gordon K Jensen, 4252 South 
700 East, Murray, Utah 84107, and to Mr Mel S Mar t in , 900 Kennecott B u i l d i n g , 
10 East South Temple S t r e e t , Sa l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84133, t h i s 1st day of 
March, 1990. 
.X^^S^^^^^^m^gL 
C. COMPLAINT AND AMENDED COMPLAINT 
c^>" 
ROBERT J. DEBRY - A004 9 . „,. - , 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES I *._!_* 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4001 South 700 East, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
feni i ^ - n 
*y\£C&l ij&&d"-
pCt/ IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
VA2 
COVE CREST PROPERTIES, 
a Utah Ltd. Partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




Civil No. CL^n-^lU^O 
Plaintiff complains of defendant as follows: 
1. Plaintiff is a subdivider and developer. 
2. Plaintiff developed a subdivision in the City 
of West Jordan by the name of Vista Via Subdivision I, 11 
and III. 
3. In August of 1978, defendant required 
plaintiff to pay the sum of $18,884.22, pursuant to City 
Ordinance 33, Section 9-C-8(a). 
4. The said ordinance was inval Id in that no 
public hearing was held as required by §10-9-25, Utah Code 
Ann. 
5. Defendant had no statutory authority to exact 
said fee from plaintiff. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for a refund of the 
said $18,884,22 plus interest. 
DATED this ,£A day of /^ ) frtMJndui, 1987. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
/ / 
/ 
By: / ^ 4 c / / \ y 
Plaintiff resides at: 
3495 South 3610 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Kay M. Lewis Bar No. (1944) 
Mel S. Martin Bar No. (2102) 
JENSEN & LEWIS, P.C. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
320 South 300 East, Suite 1 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 328-4981 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
COVECREST PROPERTIES, a ) 
Utah Limited Partnership, ) 
Plaintiff, ) AMENDED COMPLAINT 
) AND JURY DEMAND 
vs. ) 
CITY OF WEST JORDAN ) Civil No. C87-7680 
Defendant. ) Judge David S. Young 
Plaintiff Complains of Defendant as follows: 
1. Plaintiff is a Utah Limited Partnership and is a 
subdivider and developer. 
2. Plaintiff developed three contiguous subdivisions 
in the City of West Jordan by the names of Vista Via Subdivision 
I, II, and III. 
3. In August of 1978, Defendant required Plaintiff to 
pay the sum of $18,884.22, pursuant to city ordinance 33, Section 
9-C-8(a). 
4. The said ordinance was invalid in that no public 
was held as required by Subsection 10-9-25, Utah Code Ann, 
5. Defendant had no statutory authority to exact said 
fee from Plaintiff. 
£ O K J ^ Ifta&wso 
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6. Plaintiff requests a jury trial in connection with 
this matter and has previously filed its jury fee in connection 
herewith. 
7. Tendered herewith is Plaintiff's cash bond, in the 
amount of $300.00, for deposit and retention by the clerk, during 
the pendency of this matter. Said bond is proffered in 
compliance with U.C.A. Section 63-30-19, which requires an 
undertaking, "conditioned upon payment by the plaintiff of 
taxable costs incurred by the governmental entity 
in the action if the plaintiff fails to prosecute the action or 
fails to recover judgment." Plaintiff asks that the money be 
deposited in an interest bearing account, so that it can be 
returned with interest, in the event that the Court does not 
direct otherwise. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for a judgment against the 
Defendant and a refund of said $18,884.22 plus interest. 
DATED this 4 ^ day of MAXCt/ , 1988. 
JENSEN & LEWIS, P.C. 
KAY M. LEWIS 
MEL S. MARTIN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Plaintiff's address: 
3495 South 3610 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
